In standard treatments of probability, Pr ðAjBÞ is defined as the ratio of Pr ðA \ BÞ to Pr ðBÞ, provided that Pr ðBÞ > 0. This account of conditional probability suggests a psychological question, namely, whether estimates of Pr ðAjBÞ arise in the mind via implicit calculation of Pr ðA \ BÞ=Pr ðBÞ. We tested this hypothesis (Experiment 1) by presenting brief visual scenes composed of forms, and collecting estimates of relevant probabilities. Direct estimates of conditional probability were not well predicted by Pr ðA \ BÞ=Pr ðBÞ. Direct estimates were also closer to the objective probabilities defined by the stimuli, compared to estimates computed from the foregoing ratio. The hypothesis that Pr ðAjBÞ arises from the ratio Pr ðA \ BÞ=½Pr ðA \ BÞ þ Pr ðA \ BÞ fared better (Experiment 2). In a third experiment, the same hypotheses were evaluated in the context of subjective estimates of the chance of future events.
Introduction
Consider the chance that France wins the next World Soccer Cup ðFÞ. Now consider it again but this time assuming that Italy is eliminated before the quarter finals ðIÞ. The latter judgment is your conditional probability for F given I, denoted Pr ðFjIÞ. How does the mind estimate such chances?
The matter is central to Bayesian accounts of updating a probability distribution Pr to accommodate the information that an event B has occurred (for sure). According to Bayesians (Hacking, 2001 ), the revised distribution should be Pr ðÁjBÞ, which assigns a given event A the conditional probability Pr ðAjBÞ. The psychology of updating has typically been investigated in settings that offer base rates and likelihoods, thereby authorizing use of Bayes' Theorem to compute conditional probability. The resulting literature considers whether these latter quantities are suitably deployed (Koehler, 1996; Tversky & Kahneman, 1982) . When Bayes' Theorem is conceptualized as a means of calculating conditional probability, however, a different question is highlighted: what does conditional probability represent to the reasoner, in other words, how is it mentally defined? This question is also connected to inductive inference. For, the conditional probability of A given B is a plausible interpretation of the ''strength" of an argument with premise B and conclusion A. Inductive inference has been extensively examined in these terms (Feeney & Heit, 2007) . Such studies illuminate the conditions affecting estimates of conditional probability, e.g., typicality (Murphy & Ross, 2005) , the kind and number of categories involved (Ross et al., 1996 (Ross et al., , 1999 , and the role of similarity (Weber & Osherson, in press ). But these studies provide limited information about the interpretation of conditional probability in the mind of the reasoner. This is because they rely on conditional probability to measure inductive strength but do not investigate how it is mentally represented. Fox and Levav (2004) offer insightful analysis of conditional probability assessments in a setting that allows counting of target events. They examine influences on the categories participants' count, and the use made of these numbers. Many situations, however, do not lend themselves to such numerical strategies, either because
